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INTRODUCTION:
A SURVEY OF THE COUNTERFEIT TRADEMARKED
GOODS INDUSTRY IN NEW YORK CITY
Canal Street bisects Lower Manhattan from east to west little
more than four miles south of the lavish storefronts of Madison
and Fifth Avenues that constitute the apex of high-end luxury
retailing in New York City.1 The extravagance of the gilded retail
temples of Fifth and Madison Avenues mirrors the hedonistic
opulence of the high-cost, high-margin wares these shops
showcase and sell. The cramped, dank, and dingy retail storefronts
of Canal Street, sandwiched as they are between suspect
fishmongers and open-air food stalls, encourage, in marked
contrast, recollections that the low-lying land atop which the
present-day thoroughfare sits originally served as Manhattan’s
primary sewage culvert.2 Yet, a cursory perusal of the stores of
Canal Street would suggest to a naïve—or willfully blind—
shopper that these low-rent operations are miraculously able to
stock the same luxury fashion accessories as the up-market
retailers situated further uptown, and are inexplicably able to sell
such items at exponentially lower price points.
Such an
unenlightened consumer might conclude that the low prices of
Canal Street’s luxury goods are a product of the lower overhead
costs borne by the owners of the smaller, shabbier stores. The real
means through which Canal Street retailers are able to price their
ersatz luxury goods so far below the levels adhered to by
1
Google Maps, http://maps.google.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). The actual
distance varies depending on the particular start and end points of the measurement.
2
See EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK
CITY TO 1898, at 359–60 (1999). Canal Street initially existed as an eight-foot wide open
sewer. See id. When the city covered this ditch over in 1819, it neglected to install air
traps, so the area continued to stink of sewage. See id. at 360.
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legitimate retailers, however, is an open secret for anyone who
cares to look: Canal Street is the epicenter of New York City’s
counterfeit luxury goods trade. On this teeming thoroughfare little
more than a mile in length3 one can find innumerable seemingly
authentic brand name products from Sony electronics to Gucci
handbags. None of this merchandise is real, but no one seems to
care.
The heart of counterfeit goods retailing along Canal Street lies
only four-tenths of a mile north of the offices of the Criminal
Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York, and only two-tenths of a mile north of the
New York County District Attorney’s Office at One Hogan Place.4
The distance between the counterfeit goods retailers of Canal
Street and the offices of the government attorneys who bear the
burden of prosecuting such operations is so short that a New York
County Assistant District Attorney could walk up to Canal Street,
purchase a counterfeit designer handbag, and return to the office in
the course of a morning coffee break.5
Astonishingly, a
government prosecutor could embark on such an excursion without
violating a single state or federal law, and could thus proudly
march back into her office with statutory impunity.
Whether she could make this walk with a clear conscience,
however, is another matter altogether. In 2004, the value of the
global trade in pirated and counterfeit goods surpassed
$600 billion.6 Almost seven percent of all merchandise sold
worldwide is either counterfeit or pirated.7 American businesses
3

Google Maps, supra note 1.
Id. All commercial activity along Canal Street, both legal and illicit, counterfeit
goods retailing included, is concentrated east of the Avenue of the Americas. Id. West of
the Avenue of the Americas, Canal Street transforms to function principally as a feeder
for the Holland Tunnel leading towards New Jersey. Id.
5
The Manhattan Criminal Courts Building, which houses the headquarters of the New
York County District Attorney’s Office, lies atop land that once contained Collect Pond,
the cesspool that drained into the culvert that begat Canal Street. See Carol Groneman,
Collect, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 250, 250 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed.,
1995).
6
Laurie J. Flynn, U.S. Discloses Moves to Stop Piracy of Intellectual Property, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at C7 (citing statistics from the World Customs Organization and
Interpol).
7
Id. (citing projections of the World Customs Organization and Interpol).
4
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estimate that the scourge of counterfeit and pirated products costs
them $250 billion in lost revenues every year.8 The value of the
counterfeit goods trade in New York City alone is $23 billion.9 Of
particular interest to the hypothetical counterfeit-handbagpurchasing Assistant District Attorney, the City of New York, her
employer, loses $1.03 billion in uncollected tax revenues each year
at the hands of the illegal counterfeit goods trade.10 While this
attorney prosecutes a myriad of miscreants, including traffickers of
counterfeit trademarked goods, she is contributing to the
defrauding of her employer—though technically committing no
crime—as she carries her trial materials to the courtroom in a
counterfeit bag.
Part I of this Note addresses the daunting size and pervasive
scope of the worldwide trade in counterfeit trademarked goods,
while noting that United States law, at both state and federal levels,
lags behind the statutory schemes of certain European nations in its
efforts to stem the propagation of ersatz luxury wares. Part II
examines the identity and methods of operation of the
multinational organized crime groups and terrorist organizations
that dominate the illegal counterfeit goods trade in the United
States.
Part III chronicles American anti-counterfeiting enforcement
efforts at the federal level, with a primary focus on the nature and
use of the criminal provisions of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act
of 1984 (“1984 Act”),11 the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”),12 and the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986 (“Money Laundering Act”)13 in prosecutions for
trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods. Part III also
addresses the changes wrought by Congress’ recent amendment of
the 1984 Act criminalizing trademarked labels unattached to other
8

Id.
Press Release, Office of N.Y. City Comptroller, Thompson: Counterfeiting Costs
NYC More than $1 Billion Annually (Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with author), available at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/2004_releases/pr04-11-065.shtm.
10
Id. This loss arises from a combination of unpaid sales, business income, and
personal income taxes. Id.
11
18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006).
12
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000).
13
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2000).
9
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goods.14
Part IV assesses state-level prohibitions against
trafficking in counterfeit goods from the standpoint of New York
state law, devoting particular attention to the trademark
counterfeiting,15 enterprise corruption,16 and money laundering17
provisions of the New York Penal Law.
Part V surveys the civil anti-counterfeiting enforcement
options available to trademark owners, concentrating on trademark
owners’ ability to sue the landlords of businesses that sell
counterfeit goods under the Lanham Act18 and New York Real
Property Law19 through the doctrine of contributory liability.20
Part V also considers why trademark owners fail to make more
extensive use of their capacity to sue enterprises engaged in the
trafficking and sale of counterfeit goods under the civil provisions
of RICO.21
Part VI concludes that while legislators could amend the
statutory anti-counterfeiting provisions presently in force at both
the state and federal levels in certain limited respects as one
component of a pervasive effort to curb the proliferation of
counterfeit goods, the prohibitions against trademark
counterfeiting as they currently exist are on the whole sufficient to
combat and curtail the counterfeit goods trade, provided law
enforcement and prosecutorial agencies employ and apply the
existing statutes with diligence and consistency. Neither state nor
federal law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, however,
14

See Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2,
§ 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West
2006)).
15
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.70–165.74 (McKinney 2006).
16
Organized Crime Control Act, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–460.80 (McKinney
2006).
17
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.00–470.25 (McKinney 2006).
18
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006).
19
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 231 (McKinney 2006).
20
See generally Barbara Kolsun & Jonathan Bayer, Indirect Infringement and
Counterfeiting: Remedies Available Against Those Who Knowingly Rent to
Counterfeiters, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 383, 413–17 (1998); Fara S. Sunderji,
Note, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm:
A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
909, 919–23 (2005).
21
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
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make effective use of the prohibitions against trademark
counterfeiting presently in force. Though both federal and New
York State statutes criminalize trafficking in counterfeit goods
irrespective of the dollar value of the merchandise involved, law
enforcement agencies evince little interest in arresting street-level
vendors of counterfeit goods, and government attorneys
demonstrate scant concern with prosecuting such low-level
offenders unless such interdictions are manifestly capable of
leading up the criminal food chain to high-volume distributors and
manufacturers of counterfeit goods.22 As long as this blasé
enforcement pattern persists, the counterfeit goods trade will
continue unabated.
I. THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE AND REMEDY
THE DANGERS OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS
Like steerers who point addicts towards narcotics dealers
lurking in the lobbies and apartments of buildings in Washington
Heights, barkers for counterfeit goods retailers ply the sidewalks of
Canal Street surreptitiously beckoning would-be customers into
squalid storefronts to purchase wares bearing the brand names of
renowned luxury goods retailers such as Gucci and Louis Vuitton.
In Washington Heights, the George Washington Bridge and
Interstate 95, both nearby,23 provide convenient entry and exit
conduits for drug buyers, many of whom are suburbanites eager to
make a quick escape from the city once they score their drug of
choice. Likewise, the eastern and western bookends of Canal
Street, the Manhattan Bridge and the Holland Tunnel,24 serve to
expedite out-of-town visitors’ excursions into Lower Manhattan to
purchase counterfeit luxury merchandise.
No quick escape is necessary, however, after purchasing
counterfeit luxury goods. If police officers in Washington Heights
observed a drug buyer purchase narcotics from a known dealer,
22

See Alison Neumer, Faux Real: For Some Buying Fake Designer Duds Is a NoBrainer, but Does Going Cheap End Up Costing You the Most?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15,
2004, at 48 (citing CEO of a corporate investigation firm).
23
See Google Maps, supra note 1.
24
See id.

COCKS_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

2007

1/23/2007 4:42 PM

COUNTERFEIT GOODS

507

enter a car with out-of-state license plates, and head for the George
Washington Bridge, they would pull the vehicle over, search for
the contraband, as the United States Supreme Court permits them
to do,25 and arrest the occupants. Law enforcement agencies
indeed arrest and prosecute, at least to some extent, importers and
retailers of counterfeit goods.26 If, however, police officers in
Lower Manhattan observe someone purchase counterfeit luxury
goods, enter a car with out-of-state license plates, and drive off
towards the Holland tunnel, the officers would not use the
purchase of the merchandise as a basis to stop the vehicle, would
not search the car for the counterfeit items, and would not arrest
the occupants for purchasing the goods. Even if law enforcement
officers wanted to arrest such retail-level buyers of counterfeit
goods, they could not legally effect such an arrest.27
Italy and France, likely spurred on by the aggressive lobbying
efforts of European luxury goods producers, criminalized the
purchase of counterfeit merchandise in the summer of 2005.28 In
France, defendants convicted of buying counterfeit goods, even at
the retail-level, now face up to three years in prison.29 In the
United States, however, no criminal liability exists under either
state or federal statutory schemes for purchasing counterfeit
products.30 Under New York State law, a defendant who sells
counterfeit trademarked goods faces a maximum of one year in jail
upon conviction, provided the retail value of the wares bearing the

25

See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 826 (1982) (holding that police officers
may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if they have probable cause to believe
there is contraband concealed within the vehicle). See also California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 394-95 (1985) (holding that a reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles
results from the extensive government regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on
highways).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Cho, 136 F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1998) (wherein United
States Customs agents conducted surveillance on defendant’s counterfeit handbag
retailing operation and defendant consequently pled guilty to two counts of trafficking in
counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2000)).
27
See generally, Neumer, supra note 22.
28
See Allessandra Galloni, Bagging Fakers and Sellers—Makers of Luxury Goods Try
New Legal Tactics Against Those Who Aid Counterfeiters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at
B1.
29
See id.
30
See id.
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counterfeit trademark is one thousand dollars or less.31 Prosecutors
cannot even charge a buyer of counterfeit goods with a crime,
regardless of the retail value of the merchandise he or she has
purchased.32
Yet the international market for counterfeit goods is nearly
twice the size of the worldwide market for illicit drugs. The dollar
value of the American counterfeit goods market exceeds the dollar
value of the American market for illegal narcotics by roughly
$100 billion, and the disparity continues to widen with each
passing year. The value of the global market in illicit drugs, based
on retail sale prices and with government seizures and other losses
to suppliers taken into account, totaled $322 billion in 2003, while
the value of the worldwide counterfeit goods trade surpassed
$600 billion.33 The North American segment of the worldwide
illegal narcotics market, valued at $142 billion and dominated by
the appetites of the United States, comprised forty-four percent of
the global aggregate marketplace, while American businesses lose
an estimated $250 billion each year to the illicit counterfeit goods
trade.34 Between 2001 and 2004, the incidence of seizures of
counterfeit goods at America’s borders jumped by eighty-one
percent.35
Even if heightened governmental interdiction
precipitated a portion of this increase, the rapid increase in seizure
rates suggests that the trade in counterfeit goods is a premiere
growth industry for criminal enterprises operating within the
United States. Indeed, government officials concede that, as in the
narcotics trade, seized items constitute only a fraction of the

31

See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.15, 165.71–165.72 (McKinney 2006). The term “retail
value” means the actual retail value of the counterfeit goods, not the higher retail value
the goods would have if they were legitimate. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt.
(McKinney 2006) (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary). For further discussion
of New York state statutory provisions prohibiting trademark counterfeiting, see infra
Part IV.
32
See Neumer, supra note 22.
33
1 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2005 WORLD DRUG REPORT at 127, U.N. Sales
No. E.05.XI.10 (2005); Flynn, supra note 6.
34
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 33, at 128; Flynn, supra note 6.
35
Thomas Crampton, U.S. Coordinates Efforts to Stop Counterfeit Goods, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2004, at C12 (citing figures proffered by then-Under Secretary of Homeland
Security Asa Hutchison).
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market for counterfeit goods.36 The global trade in illicit
counterfeit goods, then, more lucrative for participants and more
costly for society than the criminal narcotics industry, has
burgeoned into the largest illicit all-cash business in the world.
As the dominant illicit industry worldwide, the counterfeit
goods trade has predictably attracted the interest of international
organized crime groups.37 Drawn by the allure of the high rates of
return and extensive profits reaped from trafficking in counterfeit
goods, and further encouraged by lackadaisical governmental
enforcement of anti-counterfeiting measures, organized crime
factions have come to dominate the importation, trafficking and
distribution of high-volume counterfeit trademarked goods in the
United States.38 For organized criminal enterprises, the counterfeit
goods trade is an ideal illicit business because the considerable
financial rewards that abound in the industry substantially
outweigh the commensurately minor risk of piquing the ire of
governmental enforcement agencies.39
II. ASIAN ORGANIZED CRIME ENTERPRISES DOMINATE THE
AMERICAN COUNTERFEIT GOODS TRADE
While organized crime groups import and distribute much of
the illicit luxury merchandise sold in the United States,
counterfeiters in Asia manufacture the vast majority of these
goods.40 China is the primary source for counterfeit luxury goods

36

See Tina Cassidy, Bagging the Knockoffs: There’s Nothing Like the Real Thing,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2002, at D1 (noting a statement of Nancy Kratzer, Assistant
Director for Fraud Investigations, U.S. Customs, and Director of the National Intellectual
Property Rights Coordination Center).
37
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3 (1995) (“[C]ounterfeiting has grown into a
multibillion dollar, highly sophisticated illegal business, increasingly involving organized
crime syndicates.”).
38
See, e.g., David Johnston, Threats and Responses: The Money Trail; Fake Goods
Support Terrorism, Interpol Official Is to Testify, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A11
(noting Secretary General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble’s testimony that the connection
between organized crime groups and counterfeit goods is strong and notorious).
39
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 4.
40
See Cassidy, supra note 36.
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sold throughout the world.41 Within China, production of
counterfeit luxury merchandise is concentrated in southern
provinces such as Guangdong.42 No doubt owing to China’s
dominance in the manufacturing of counterfeit wares, Chinese
organized crime groups, known colloquially as triads or tongs, are
responsible for the importation of a considerable portion of the
counterfeit trademarked goods that enter the United States, and for
the distribution of such merchandise once it reaches American
shores.43 Indeed, Canal Street functions as the hub of triadoperated counterfeit goods distribution system with tendrils
extending throughout the northeastern United States.44 The
government’s seizure of $4 million worth of counterfeit
trademarked luxury goods from four warehouses in Manhattan and
Queens following the indictment of thirteen alleged members of
Chinese gangs on a bevy of federal charges including counterfeit
goods trafficking—and, for three of the defendants, RICO
violations—is illustrative of the prominent role Chinese organized
crime groups play in the counterfeit goods trade.45 The pervasive
influence of Chinese criminal enterprises in the illicit counterfeit
goods industry, however, does not function as a barrier to other
structured criminal groups entering the trade.
Organized crime collectives whose members are of other Asian
ethnicities are also extensively involved in the illegal counterfeit
goods industry.46 Every major Asian nationality appears to some
extent on the organized crime landscape of the United States.47

41

See Andrew Yeh, The Complex Trade in Luxurious Fakes, FIN. TIMES ASIA
(London), Apr. 19, 2006, at 10.
42
See id.
43
See Cassidy, supra note 36. See generally Allessandra Galloni, Faked Out: As
Luxury Goes Global, Knock-Off Merchants Follow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at A1.
44
See Debra D. Peterson, Criminal Counterfeiting and Component Parts: Closing the
Perceived “Label Loophole,” 30 AIPLA Q.J. 457, 472 n.73 (2002) (citing a position of
the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition).
45
See Julia Preston, U.S. Charges 51 with Chinatown Smuggling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2004, at B2; Press Release, U.S. Att’y for S. Dist. N.Y., U.S. Indicts 51 Chinese
Organized Crime Figures in Massive Coordinated Sweep (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with
author), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/NOVEMBER04/
Chinese&20OC&20Indicmtent.pdf.
46
See HERBERT C. COVEY ET AL., JUVENILE GANGS 88 (2d ed. 1997).
47
Id.
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Although not all Asian gangs are involved in the trafficking of
counterfeit trademarked merchandise,48 the extensive participation
of Korean organized crime groups in the illicit counterfeit goods
trade is commensurate with the involution of Chinese criminal
enterprises in the industry.49 In September 1995, federal law
enforcement authorities, at the culmination of a two-and-a-halfyear investigation christened Operation Pipeline,50 raided
warehouses in New York City and Los Angeles that served as the
east and west coast distribution centers of a Korean organized
crime syndicate deeply entrenched in the overseas manufacture and
international trafficking of counterfeit trademarked goods.51
Agents seized $27 million worth of counterfeit trademarked
merchandise bearing brand names such as Polo and Chanel as
prosecutors unsealed indictments charging forty-three members
and associates of the counterfeiting ring, all Korean, with
trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods.52
The substantial dollar value of the illicit goods recovered
through the interdiction, and the sheer scope of the criminal
counterfeiting collective unearthed, suffice in and of themselves to
memorialize Operation Pipeline as a pivotal event in the
government’s struggle to combat and curtail the trade in illegal
48

Members of the yakuza, the Japanese organized criminal syndicates, for example,
make gambling, pornography, prostitution and drug distribution the focus of their
unlawful activities, and shy away from trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods. See
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional
and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 66 (2000). But cf.
Imitating Property Is Theft, THE ECONOMIST, May 15, 2003, at 54 (noting that until Japan
underwent industrialization, it was a breeding ground for counterfeit goods in the 1960s;
suggesting that there is a direct correlation between industrialization and curtailing the
manufacture of counterfeit merchandise).
49
See Boonghee Yoo & Seung-Hee Lee, The Buyers of Counterfeit Products in South
Korea, 3 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 95, 97 (2004) (noting that according to the South Korean
Customs Service, U.S. Customs agents interdict more counterfeit goods from South
Korea than from any other country save China).
50
There is no connection between this investigation and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) program of the same name implicated in the racial profiling of
minorities by law enforcement officers. See Drug Enforcement Administration,
Operations Pipeline and Convoy, http://www.dea.gov/programs/pipecon.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2006) (describing the DEA operation).
51
George James, Agents Raid Production Line in Queens for Fake Labels, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1995, at B3.
52
Id.
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counterfeit goods.53 Three distinct facets of the investigation,
however, render the events surrounding Operation Pipeline worthy
of further consideration. First, it is of decisive import to note that
without the insistent impetus of Chanel, it is exceedingly unlikely
that federal prosecutors and law enforcement agencies would have
embarked upon Operation Pipeline.54 The government initiated
Operation Pipeline only after Chanel approached customs officials
in Miami with detailed information about an ongoing
counterfeiting operation producing and distributing counterfeit
Chanel apparel and accessories.55 Once in possession of this
information, Government authorities were no doubt emboldened in
their pursuit of the counterfeiting syndicate by the approximately
$1 million pecuniary contribution Chanel pledged to the
investigation.56 Chanel’s decision to urge the government to take
action against the counterfeiting collective, coupled with the
company’s provision of financial assistance for the government’s
investigation, is of immense consequence in that it represents one
of the earliest documented instances of a private-sector company
spearheading a criminal investigation into the counterfeiting of its
trademarked products.57
Second, the nature and characteristics of the items law
enforcement agents recovered during their raids of the warehouses
warrant careful attention. While Asian manufacturers dispatched
some of the merchandise seized by federal agents overseas with the
labels and patches bearing the counterfeit trademarks already
affixed, members of the counterfeiting syndicate also attached
labels and patches bearing counterfeit trademarks to previously
non-branded items once the wares reached the United States.58 In
a factory in Flushing, one of the three locations law enforcement
53

See generally id. (noting the dollar amount seized, the number of people arrested,
and that the seizure represented the U.S. government’s first successful attempt to track
the flow of counterfeit goods from manufacturers, to distributors, and finally to retailers).
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY AND THE
BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 256 (1999).
57
Lauren D. Amendolara, Note, Knocking Out Knock-Offs: Effectuating the
Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 789, 823 (2005).
58
James, supra note 51.
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officers raided in Queens during Operation Pipeline, agents
discovered computers loaded with elaborate graphics software
capable of reproducing intricately detailed trademarked brand
logos linked to two automated looms driving twenty-one
embroidery machines apiece.59 In Los Angeles, federal agents
unearthed the low-tech contingent of the counterfeiting collective
when they came upon seventy-seven illegal immigrants in a
sweatshop seated at sewing machines affixing counterfeit
“Guess?” labels to jeans.60
While the means by which counterfeiters affix labels bearing
counterfeit trademarks to previously non-branded items is
immaterial, the locale in which counterfeiters attach these labels is
of considerable significance.61 Counterfeiters frequently import
merchandise into the United States from Asia unlabeled and
without branding, so that in the unlikely event that Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) or Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents seize the goods at the border, the
counterfeiters can escape criminal culpability by arguing that they
cannot be guilty of trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods
since the merchandise they are brining into the country bears no
trademarks.62 When a counterfeiter has computerized high-tech
embroidery machines or an army of illegal immigrants and boxes
of labels bearing counterfeit trademarks at his disposal, however,
the added time and effort expended in affixing the counterfeit label
of a trademarked brand to goods inside the United States scarcely
qualifies as an inconvenience.63
Waiting until goods make it past customs before attaching
labels displaying counterfeit trademarks is only one of the
multitude of tactics that counterfeiters employ to contravene the

59

Id.
Id.
61
See Tracie Rozhon, Handbag Maker Takes Aim at Knockoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2002, at C4.
62
See id.
63
For a discussion of the implications of Congress’ recent amendment of the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, which now proscribes not only trafficking in
goods to which labels and patches bearing counterfeit trademarks are affixed, but also
trafficking in the labels and patches bearing the trademarks themselves, see infra Part III.
60
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law.64 Another novel method of evading criminal sanctions
favored by counterfeiters of designer handbags is roughly
analogous to a false-bottomed suitcase: the manufacturer of a
counterfeit handbag places a false layer of material over the bag to
disguise its illicit origins on its journey from Asia to the United
States, and the distributor of the bag simply removes this
camouflage in preparation for sale.65 In one almost ludicrous
instance, New Jersey law enforcement officials, with the assistance
of drug-sniffing canines, discovered that an organized crime group
had stitched heroin into the linings of counterfeit Louis Vuitton
handbags, presumably in a fruitless attempt to secret both illegal
products into the United States in one fell swoop.66 This discovery
lends considerable credence to the contention that organized crime
collectives involved in the counterfeit goods trade are effectively
criminal conglomerates with diversified interests spread
throughout a number of unlawful activities.67
Operation Pipeline lastly marks the emergence of
governmental recognition of the presence of a new type of
diversified criminal enterprise in the United States: Korean
organized crime syndicates.68 Korean organized crime groups
trace their origins to the Korea of the 1940s, where they began as
incipient political factions aiming to promote the Korean National
Independence movement, which later became corrupt.69
Beginning in 1950, the Korean government recognized the
increasing prominence of indigenous organized crime collectives,
known in Korea as “PAs,” and moved to classify such
organizations into one of two categories: political or

64

See Cassidy, supra note 36.
See id. (citing Nancy Kratzer).
66
See S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 5 (1995).
67
See generally S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3 (“[C]ounterfeiting has grown into a
multibillion dollar, highly sophisticated illegal business, increasingly involving organized
crime syndicates.”).
68
See James, supra note 51 (noting the acknowledgment of Robert E. Van Etten,
Special Agent in Charge of Customs in New York, that Korean organized crime is an
emerging problem in the United States).
69
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN
CALIFORNIA: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20 (1996).
65
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entertainment.70 While in the past South Korean politicians
employed the political PAs to infiltrate the government and rival
political parties in an effort to undermine the balance of power and
effect regime change, the use of political PAs to fulfill such
Machiavellian aspirations has declined precipitously in recent
years as the South Korean political landscape stabilized and the
country’s economy blossomed.71
Today, although the
entertainment PAs that control bars, nightclubs, and casinos in
Korea are more prominent, political and entertainment PAs are still
known, on occasion, to work together in pursuit of a shared goal.72
In South Korea, PAs adhere to a rigid pyramidal organizational
hierarchy analogous to the structure of a La Cosa Nostra (“LCN”)
crime family.73 A boss, a second-in-command, or underboss, and
an advisor acting as counsel, similar to a consigliere in LCN, sit at
the top of the pyramid.74 Below them is a staff, comparable to
LCN capos, which in turn precedes activity leaders, akin to LCN
soldiers, and activity members, the counterparts of LCN
associates.75 As the South Korean government initiated a
crackdown on PAs in the 1980s and early 1990s, many PA leaders
fled to other countries, including the United States, where they
settled in communities with Korean enclaves such as Los Angeles
and New York City.76 Once in the United States, former PA
leaders founded and fostered organized criminal syndicates lacking
the rigid pyramidal hierarchy of the Korean PAs.77 The Korean
Power criminal collective is emblematic of the new breed of

70

BILL LOCKYER, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN
CALIFORNIA: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 18 (2004).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
James O. Finckenauer, INTERNATIONAL CENTER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, LA
COSA NOSTRA IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/lcn.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
74
LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 20.
75
Id.
76
See LOCKYER, supra note 70, at 18; LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 20; Alan Feur,
5 Men Said to Be in Korean Mob Are Charged in Waiter’s Assault, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2001, at B8.
77
LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 20.
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Korean organized crime group that emerged in the United States.78
In contrast to both LCN and the traditional Korean PAs, Korean
Power does not adhere to a pyramidal boss-captain-solder
organizational structure.79 Instead, the syndicate bifurcates its
constituency into Big Brothers, who plan and orchestrate the
group’s criminal conduct, and Little Brothers, who actually
perpetrate the organization’s criminal undertakings.80
The decision of contemporary United States-based Korean
organized crime factions to adopt an amorphous administrative
framework in place of the rigid pyramidal organizational structure
typical of classic organized crime operations may initially appear
counterproductive. The wisdom of this choice, however, manifests
itself upon closer inspection: by implementing a more malleable
managerial framework, Korean organized crime factions avert the
attentions of law enforcement agencies, thereby depriving such
agencies of the intelligence they need in order to infiltrate these
groups while allowing the criminal enterprises to continue
unabated in their unlawful activities. Because of the nebulous
organizational framework embraced by the Korean organized
crime syndicates, for example, the California Attorney General is
able to proffer only a vague allusion that “[a]lthough structured,
the various Korean organized crime groups in the United States do
not have a single leader and vary in size from 20 to more than 100
members.”81 While this empty declaration betrays the Attorney
General’s lack of insight regarding the demographics of Korean
organized crime collectives, his subsequent statement that
“[c]rimes committed by the Korean organized crime group include
prostitution, alien smuggling, gambling, business fraud,
robbery . . . carjacking, and the counterfeiting of designer
clothes,”82 implies that although he knows Korean groups are
78

The Korean Killers, also known simply as KK, are another example of the new type
of Korean criminal organization that has arisen in the United States. See Michael D.
Shear, Officials Seek Increase in Crime-Fighting Funds; Youth Gangs Cited as a
Growing Problem, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1995, at V01 (noting that the Korean Killers
have a nationwide presence).
79
Feur, supra note 76.
80
Id.
81
LUNGREN, supra note 69, at 21.
82
Id. (emphasis added).
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committing certain crimes, he is at a loss regarding which factions
are perpetrating particular acts. The syndicates could not ask for
anything more.
Like Korean criminal collectives, Vietnamese gangs often seek
to steer clear of gaining any sort of notoriety amongst the general
public, and may even refuse to adopt gang names in an effort to
avoid raising the suspicions of law enforcement authorities.83
Avoidance of the limelight was apparently not, however, a priority
for the Born to Kill (“BTK”) gang, a Vietnamese criminal
syndicate also known as the Canal Boys that held sway over much
of Lower Manhattan’s Chinatown in the late 1980s and early
1990s.84 David Thai, the former ringleader of the BTK gang
presently serving three consecutive life sentences in federal prison,
claims that the gang reaped millions of dollars in profits from
selling counterfeit Rolex and Cartier watches.85 The BTK gang
promptly put the proceeds from these counterfeit timepiece sales to
use bankrolling a cornucopia of criminal activities including
robbery, extortion, and murder, perpetrated in locales as distant
from Chinatown as Doraville, Georgia.86
Counterfeiters can reap substantial sums of money with
commensurately little risk through the trafficking, distribution, and
sale of counterfeit goods; and can divert profits to other criminal
activities. Thus, the counterfeit goods industry is attractive not
only to conventional organized crime groups, but also to terrorist
organizations and rogue nations.87 Indeed, the highest-ranking
official at Interpol contends that both Hezbollah and Al Qaeda
83
James Diego Vigil & Steve Chong Yun, Vietnamese Youth Gangs in Southern
California, in GANGS IN AMERICA, 146, 159 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 1990).
84
See generally United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 794–800 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing
the various criminal activities of BTK and its members through 1980s and 1990s).
85
See S. REP. NO. 104-77, at 4–5 (1995).
86
See Thai, 29 F.3d at 794–800; S. REP. NO. 104-77, at 6.
87
See Counterfeiting and Theft of Tangible Intellectual Property: Challenges and
Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2004)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.cfm?id=1119&wit_id=103
(asserting that terrorist groups launder money from trafficking in counterfeit goods to
fund criminal activities); Peter Navarro, Op-Ed., Only China, Not U.S., Can Rein in N.
Korea, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 2006, at C29 (stating that North Korea is immune from UN
sanctions because of trafficking in counterfeit goods).
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have turned to trafficking in counterfeit goods to generate
revenue.88 Organized crime syndicates inherently adopt selfprotective measures to ward off government seizure of their goods
and arrest of their personnel as a component of their overarching
goal of maximizing their illicit profits by remaining in the
counterfeit goods trade as long as possible.89 Conversely, terrorist
cells immersed in the counterfeit merchandise industry presumably
intend to remain in the trade only for a limited time, until they sell
the finite quantity of counterfeit goods necessary to meet their
fundraising threshold. A terrorist organization performing a costbenefit analysis prior to deciding whether to enter the counterfeit
goods trade, then, would arrive at a risk-reward dichotomy even
more disproportionate than those reached by organized crime
groups, for terrorist organizations, concerned as they are only with
short-term gains, can wholly disregard any long-term risks.
Since the ample pecuniary rewards ready for the taking in the
counterfeit goods industry radically outweigh the trivial odds of
arrest, prosecution, and seizure of the illicit merchandise, let alone
the infinitesimal probability that the government will uncover the
terrorists’ scheme, it is unsurprising that terrorist organizations
have already made full and fruitful use of the worldwide trade in
counterfeit goods to finance a portion of at least one attack against
the United States.90 Terrorists funded their 1993 attack on the
World Trade Center at least in part with profits derived from a
counterfeit t-shirt vending operation.91 Some individuals, typically
advocates for vigorous enforcement of trademark owners’ rights
such as Roslyn A. Mazer, an Associate Deputy Attorney General
in the Clinton Administration,92 assert that the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 were also funded, at least in part, by sales of
88
Johnston, supra note 38 (noting Secretary General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble’s
testimony on the involvement of terrorist organizations in the counterfeit goods trade).
89
For examples of such self-protective measures, see supra notes 59–62 and
accompanying text.
90
See Roslyn A. Mazer, From T-Shirts to Terrorism: That Fake Nike Swoosh May Be
Helping to Fund Bin Laden’s Network, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at B2; Betsy
Streisand, Jingle All the Way?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 16, 2002, at 36.
91
Mazer, supra note 90; Streisand, supra note 90.
92
Julian E. Barnes, Fake Goods are Flowing Under the Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2001, § 3, at 34.
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counterfeit computer software in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, a
South American hotbed of counterfeiting and piracy activity.93
While Ms. Mazer’s assertion regarding the funding of the
September 11 attacks lacks definitive substantiation, and her
remarks have drawn considerable rebuke from critics,94 these
shortcomings do not displace the fact that trafficking in counterfeit
consumer goods is fast becoming the favored method of
fundraising for a number of terrorist organizations, and this trend
shows no signs of abating.95
The opportunities for pecuniary gain in the counterfeit goods
trade are so great that even the rogue regime in North Korea,
confronted with the prospect of diminishing revenue streams as
sales from its once lucrative arm business begin to dry up, has
entered the fray. Pyongyang now boasts a booming trade in
counterfeit cigarettes, pharmaceuticals and currency.96 American
officials estimate that North Korea now earns $500 million
annually from trafficking in counterfeit merchandise.97 North
Korea’s counterfeiting activities, however, are wholly distinct from
those of the Korean organized crime syndicates operating within
the United States, which maintain ties with South Korea as part of
their supply chains.98 North Korea functions on an entirely
different plane. Apparently disinterested in dabbling in counterfeit
luxury goods, North Korea’s focus on counterfeiting cigarettes,
pharmaceuticals, and good old-fashioned cash meshes with its
hardscrabble, iconoclastic image.99 North Korea is the first

93

Mazer, supra note 90.
See Naomi Klein, Comment & Analysis: McWorld & Jihad, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Oct. 5, 2001 (suggesting that Ms. Mazer’s assertions stem from disingenuous
political opportunism).
95
See Johnston, supra note 38 (noting Secretary General of Interpol Ronald K. Noble’s
testimony on the involvement of terrorist organizations in the counterfeit goods trade).
96
See Jay Solomon & Gordon Fairclough, North Korea’s Counterfeit Goods
Targeted—U.S. Seeks to Curb Illicit Business in Cigarettes, Drugs, Currency to Augment
Diplomacy, WALL. ST. J., June 1, 2005, at A4.
97
Id.
98
See generally LOCKYER, supra note 70, at 18 (discussing South Korean Organized
Crime).
99
See id.
94
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governmental regime since Nazi Germany that has attempted to
make money by counterfeiting American currency.100
Since North Korea is a sovereign national entity, albeit a
ruthless dictatorship, one might be disinclined to brand the entire
country as a criminal enterprise. American officials, however,
appear to have no such qualms.101 The United States Ambassador
to South Korea has repeatedly referred to the North as a “criminal
regime,”102 while an expert on negotiation and Korean policy
testified before a Senate subcommittee that the North Korean
Government “is not unlike an organized crime family, but . . .
characterized by a higher degree of ruthlessness carried out on a
scale that dwarfs the mafia’s reach,” and that “the North Korean
‘state’ is actually a group of thugs.”103 North Korea, then, is in the
eyes of the United States government, an organized crime
syndicate expanded to a hyperbolic extreme. The government,
however, could turn much of its vitriolic concern about North
Korea to significantly better use elsewhere. The United States
government is simply not capable of shuttering North Korea’s
counterfeiting industries, and since the government, over which
Kim Jong-Il holds unbridled power, controls all of the nation’s
industries, any effort to prosecute North Korean counterfeiting out
of existence would prove unworkable.
If the government redirected even a small fraction of the
attention it expends on North Korea to eradicating the counterfeit
goods trade within the United States, it would begin to see
perceptible reductions in counterfeit goods trafficking activity
almost immediately. In contrast to the North Korean government,
the Asian organized crime syndicates that dominate the
importation and wholesale distribution of counterfeit goods in
America are not immune to prosecution. The statutory provisions
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit goods presently in force at
100

See James Brooke, Talks Stalled, U.S. Envoy Matches Insults of North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at A10.
101
See id.
102
Id. (quoting Ambassador Alexander Vershbow).
103
How North Korea Funds Its Regime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Fin.
Mgmt, Govt. Info., & Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govt’l Aff., 109th
Cong. 1–2 (2006) (statement of Chuck Downs, Author, OVER THE LINE: NORTH KOREA’S
NEGOTIATING STRATEGY).
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both the state and federal levels, although not flawless, are
sufficient to effectuate a sea change in the counterfeit goods trade
in the United States when applied diligently, expeditiously and
evenhandedly.
To date, however, prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies have lacked the resolve to maximize the
effectiveness of these laws by applying them consistently and
creatively.
III. FEDERAL STATUTES PROVIDE PROSECUTORS WITH POTENT
WEAPONS TO COMBAT COUNTERFEITING
The United States Constitution expressly provides for the
protection of patents and copyrights.104 Congress did not enact any
comprehensive legislation pertaining to trademarks, however, until
it passed the Trademark Act of 1870.105 While this statute afforded
lawful owners of trademarks the ability to seek injunctive relief
and money damages from violators,106 Congress did not
criminalize trademark counterfeiting until it passed the Penal Act
of 1876,107 which threatened violators with fines and a two-year
maximum prison sentence upon conviction.108 The Supreme Court
dashed these initial congressional efforts to protect trademarks and
thwart counterfeiting when it declared in The Trade-Mark Cases
that since federal control of trademarks was an “exercise of a
power not confided to Congress,” all federal statutes regulating
trademarks were unconstitutional.109
Congress responded
cautiously with the Trademark Act of 1881,110 which, because it
only policed the use of trademarks in commerce with foreign
nations or Indian tribes, was sure to pass muster under the

104

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77–84, 16 Stat. 198, 210–12, invalidated by The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). See Brian J. Kearney, The Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984: A Sensible Response to the Ills of Commercial
Counterfeiting, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 125 (1985–1986).
106
See Act of July 8, 1870 § 79.
107
Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, § 1, 19 Stat. 141, invalidated by The Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82.
108
See id.
109
See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97–99.
110
Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502.
105
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Commerce Clause.111 This legislation was followed by the
Trademark Act of 1905,112 which, having been amended sixteen
times by the 1930s,113 came to resemble “a crazy quilt of
modifications.”114 Congress replaced this hodgepodge with a
cohesive scheme for the federal regulation and protection of
trademarks when it passed the Lanham Act, which remains the
cornerstone of federal trademark law, in 1946.115
The Lanham Act supplies lawful trademark owners with an
arsenal of legal weapons which they may employ against
counterfeiters including forfeiture of profits to the rightful
trademark owner; seizure and destruction of all counterfeit
merchandise, as well as the means and machinery used to produce
such goods; court costs and attorneys’ fees; and compensatory
treble damages to remedy past trademark counterfeiting.116 The
Lanham Act does not, however, criminalize trafficking in
counterfeit trademarked goods.117 In fact, between the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of all federal statutes regulating trademarks in
its 1879 ruling in The Trade-mark Cases118 and Congress’
enactment of criminal penalties for trafficking in phonograph
records bearing forged or counterfeit labels in 1962,119 no criminal
prohibitions on trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods
existed at the federal level. By 1984, however, Congress
recognized that the burgeoning trade in counterfeit goods in
America was largely attributable to the fact that there were
“virtually no criminal penalties for the sale of goods and services
through the use of false trademarks,”120 and counterfeiters viewed
“potential civil penalties simply as a cost of doing their illegal
111

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
113
See Kearney, supra note 103, at 129.
114
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 5:3 (4th ed. 2001).
115
Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000)).
116
See PARADISE, supra note 56, at 8.
117
See Kearney, supra note 103, at 131.
118
100 U.S. 82, 97-99 (1879).
119
See Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-773, § 1, 76 Stat. 775 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2318 (West 2006)).
120
S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 1 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3627.
112
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business.”121 Consequently, Congress passed the 1984 Act122 as
part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984123 to combat
counterfeiters emboldened by the lack of criminal sanctions
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit merchandise and unfazed by
the potential of civil penalties.124
The 1984 Act, as initially enacted, subjected anyone who
“intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such
goods or services” to a fine of no more than $250,000 and a prison
sentence no longer than five years, or both.125 If the offender was
an entity other than an individual, such as an organized crime
syndicate or a corporation, it was subject to a maximum fine of
$1 million.126 Prior convictions for trafficking in counterfeit goods
raised the maximum sentence for an individual to a $1 million fine,
a fifteen year prison sentence, or both, and the maximum fine for
an entity other than an individual to $5 million.127 The civil
portions of the 1984 Act simultaneously enabled lawful trademark
owners to exact stiffer penalties from counterfeiters by mandating
that, absent an explicit finding of extenuating circumstances, trial
court judges must impose treble damages upon defendants
following conviction.128
The civil segments also allowed
trademark owners to seek ex parte seizures of counterfeit goods
bearing their trademarks executed via unannounced raids on
locations of known counterfeit goods trafficking activity, and
authorized judges to grant such applications if trademark owners

121

Id. at 5, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3631.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 1501–1503,
98 Stat. 1976, 2178–83 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 & 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1116–1118 (West 2006)).
123
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
124
See S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 1, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3627.
125
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 2178, 2178 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2320(a) (West 2006)).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1503, 98 Stat. 2178, 2182–83 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(b) (West 2006)).
122
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were able to demonstrate a unique and pressing need for such
seizures.129
Despite the initial criminal and heightened civil sanctions
imposed by the 1984 Act, the trade in counterfeit goods in the
United States continued to proliferate at such a rapid rate that only
twelve years later, Congress deemed its previous anticounterfeiting legislation “an inadequate remedy for the explosive
growth of criminal commercial counterfeiting.”130 Congress
reasoned that stiffer penalties were needed because the 1984 Act
took into account neither rapid technological advances that
rendered the counterfeiting of trademarked goods easier and more
lucrative, nor “the extent to which organized crime syndicates,
often operating on an international level, would become directly
involved in the manufacturing, distributing, selling, and financing
of counterfeit products.”131 Congress initially moved to heighten
penalties somewhat surreptitiously when it increased the criminal
sanctions faced by defendants convicted of trafficking in
counterfeit trademarked goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) as part
of its passage of the massive Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994.132 In the wake of these increases
individual defendants with no prior convictions for trademark
counterfeiting now face up to $2 million in fines, and a prison
sentence to up to ten years, or both, while fines of up to $5 million
await organizational offenders.133 Predicate individual offenders
now face a maximum fine of $5 million and the potential of a

129

See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1503, 98 Stat. 2178, 2180–82 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1116 (West 2006)).
130
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074,
1075. Congress noted that while losses attributable to counterfeiting totaled $5.5 billion
in 1982, this figure had ballooned to $200 billion by 1995. See S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3
(1995).
131
S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 3.
132
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 27 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.).
133
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec.
320104, § 2320(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2110 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320
(West 2006)).
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twenty-year prison term, or both, while non-individual defendants
now meet with fines of up $15 million.134
Congress also made use of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 to quietly append trafficking in
counterfeit trademarked goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 to
the laundry list of “specified unlawful activities” that can
potentially trigger a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and
1957, the statutory provisions of the Money Laundering Act.135
The first of the two money laundering statutes, § 1956,
criminalizes conducting or attempting to conduct a financial
transaction when the offender knows the property involved in the
transaction represents proceeds derived from some form of
unlawful activity and either intends “to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity” through the transaction, or commit tax
evasion or fraud; or knows that the transaction is designed to
“conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity,” or to avoid federal or state currency reporting
requirements.136 The second federal money laundering statute,
§ 1957, makes it illegal to knowingly engage “in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property [that is] of a value
greater than $10,000 and is derived from” one or more of the
crimes on the laundry list of specified unlawful activities, which
includes trafficking in counterfeit goods and services in violation
of § 2320.137 The term “monetary transaction” includes all
pecuniary activity conducted through financial institutions except
for transactions necessary to preserve a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.138
The inclusion of trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods
and services in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 in the laundry list of
134

Id.
See Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 320104, § 1956(c)(7)(D), 108 Stat. 1796, 2111
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2000)).
136
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000).
137
See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2000). Other crimes on the laundry list include destruction
of aircraft; violence at international airports; threatening a federal official; concealing
assets; firearms trafficking; financing terrorism; and a multitude to other felonies. See
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2000).
138
See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (2000).
135
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offenses constituting “specified unlawful activity” for the purposes
of the money laundering statutes threatens counterfeit goods
traffickers with the prospect of prison sentences of up to twenty
years in length, even in the case of a first offense.139 Federal
prosecutors, for example, can now charge gang members whom
they allege employed profits derived from extortion to finance
trafficking in counterfeit goods not only with trafficking in
counterfeit goods in violation of § 2320, but also with money
laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). The conduct involved in
the financial transaction required to charge a violation of
§ 1956(a)(1), however, need not be this reprehensible. In fact, it
need not even be criminal to constitute money laundering. An
individual, whether operating alone or as part of an organized
criminal syndicate, who uses proceeds reaped from trafficking in
counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags to purchase legitimate Louis
Vuitton goods for his own personal enjoyment, for example, could
be found guilty of money laundering under § 1956(a)(1), so long as
he intends for his purchase of the legitimate merchandise to
conceal the fact that his profits resulted from trafficking in
counterfeit goods.140 He faces the possibility of spending as many
as twenty years in federal prison upon conviction.141
Congress, however, believed that in order to substantially
curtail the proliferation of the counterfeit goods trade, it needed to
go beyond increasing the penalties for violating the criminal
provisions of the 1984 Act and including trafficking in counterfeit
goods on the laundry list of specified unlawful activities that
enables federal prosecutors to bring charges under the money
Consequently, Congress enacted the
laundering statutes.142
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”)
to further increase the civil and criminal penalties for trafficking in
139

See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
The money laundering statute does not, however, criminalize the mere spending of
money gained through a specified unlawful activity from the laundry list. See United
States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1472 (10th Cir. 1991). Rather, “by the express terms of
the statute, a design to conceal or disguise the source or nature of the proceeds is a
necessary element for a money laundering conviction.” Id.
141
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
142
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074,
1075.
140
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counterfeit goods and to diversify the statutory conduits through
which federal prosecutors and law enforcement authorities can
attack individuals and enterprises enmeshed in this illicit
industry.143 The 1996 Act amended the damages provisions of the
Lanham Act by affording trademark owners the option of
recovering statutory damages from counterfeiters prior to final
judgment;144 provided for the assessment of civil fines against
individuals and entities found to have aided and abetted the
importation of counterfeit goods;145 and authorized the civil
forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used to facilitate
trafficking in counterfeit merchandise.146 The 1996 Act is most
notable, however, for classifying trafficking in counterfeit goods in
violation of § 2320 as a “racketeering activity” constituting a
predicate offense subject to prosecution or civil suit under
RICO.147
Consequently, federal law now construes individuals and
organized criminal collectives who engage in patterns of
trafficking in counterfeit goods as racketeers.148 Upon conviction
of violating a criminal RICO provision, offenders are subject to a
prison sentence of no more than twenty years and a maximum fine
of twice the gross profits or other proceeds of the offenders’
racketeering activity.149
The statute also orders mandatory
forfeiture of any interest the offender acquired or maintained
through the RICO violation, including profits, proceeds and
income thereof; any interest the offender has in an enterprise used
143

See Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
144
See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec.
7, § 1117, 110 Stat. 1386, 1388 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(c) (2006)).
145
See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec.
10, § 1526, 110 Stat. 1386, 1388–89 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1526(f)
(2006)).
146
See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec.
13, § 80302, 110 Stat. 1386, 1389–90 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 80302
(2000)).
147
See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec.
3, § 1961(a)(3), 110 Stat. 1386, 1386 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)
(2000)). For a discussion of the ability of trademark owners to sue counterfeiters under
18 U.S.C. § 1964, RICO’s civil remedies provision, see infra Part V.
148
See id.
149
See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000).
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to effectuate the RICO violation; and any contractual right that
enabled the offender to wield influence over an enterprise used to
violate RICO.150 The statute’s extensive forfeiture provisions
constitute one of the most appealing aspects of employing RICO
against traffickers of counterfeit goods. Indeed, Congress noted
with enthusiasm that “RICO permits law enforcement agents to
seize nonmonetary personal and real estate assets connected with
the criminal enterprise in addition to the counterfeit goods.”151
This is a vital provision in the context of curtailing the counterfeit
goods trade, because it enables federal agents not only to seize
counterfeiters’ supplies of illicit goods, but also to eradicate the
means upon which counterfeiters rely for future production.152
Any offender, whether individual or organizational, now
violates 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) when the offender employs profits
obtained through a pattern of trafficking in counterfeit goods to
establish an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,
even if such an enterprise is not unlawful in and of itself, and
violates § 1962(b) when the offender uses profits netted through a
pattern of trafficking in counterfeit goods to maintain an interest in
such a venture.153 Individual offenders employed by or associated
with an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,
including by definition any organized crime syndicates involved
with the importation of counterfeit goods from Asia, violate
§ 1962(c) when they conduct the affairs of such an enterprise
through a pattern of trafficking in counterfeit goods.154 In order to
secure a conviction for conspiring to violate RICO under
§ 1962(d), prosecutors need not prove that at least one of the
conspirators committed an overt act to effectuate the object of the

150

See id.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 7 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074,
1079–80.
152
Congress views the looming prospect of expansive civil forfeiture provisions as so
crucial to curtailing the counterfeit goods trade that it included such provisions in § 2320
with its recent amendment of that statute. See Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured
Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)).
153
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
154
See id.
151
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conspiracy as is required under the general conspiracy statute.155
Nor must prosecutors demonstrate that a conspirator committed or
agreed to commit the two predicate acts necessary to create the
pattern of racketeering activity required for a RICO conviction in
order to secure a conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO.156 In
order to obtain a conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO,
prosecutors must establish only that an offender embraced the goal
of furthering an illicit enterprise, which, if completed, would fulfill
the requirements of a substantive RICO offense.157
While the apparent ease of securing a conviction for conspiring
to violate RICO might lead one to conclude that the government
could all but eradicate the counterfeit goods trade in the United
States by charging everyone on the distribution chain, from streetlevel vendors upwards, under § 1962(d), the intricacies of applying
the RICO provisions belie such a position. Prosecutions of
traffickers of counterfeit goods under RICO are bound by the same
statutory encumbrances that plague all RICO actions, which
perhaps explains the scant record of criminal prosecutions of
traffickers of counterfeit goods under RICO.158 The greatest
hurdle prosecutors must surmount in all RICO actions is the
establishing of the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity.
Section 1961 merely states that a pattern requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity to occur within ten years of one another.159
The Supreme Court has held “that to prove a pattern of
racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the
racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose
a threat of continued criminal activity.”160
This governing two-pronged formulation for determining the
existence of a pattern of racketeering activity, commonly referred
155
See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997). See also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the
general conspiracy statute).
156
See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64.
157
See id. at 65.
158
Despite the fact that trafficking in counterfeit goods and services in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (West 2006) has been a predicate violation for RICO purposes for ten
years, there are to date no cases addressing the prosecution of traffickers of counterfeit
goods under RICO provisions present in the federal record.
159
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
160
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
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as the “continuity plus relationship test,” while still purposefully
amorphous, demarcates approximate boundaries of what
constitutes a pattern.161 Under this conceptualization, while a
group of otherwise legitimate business owners who collaborate to
import a single container filled with counterfeit goods on one
occasion fails to meet the continuity prong, a loose assemblage of
criminals, some of whom traffic in counterfeit goods while others
perpetrate environmental crimes, falls short of meeting the
relationship requirement.162 At the opposite end of the spectrum,
an organized criminal syndicate that systematically imports and
distributes shipments of counterfeit goods and uses the profits it
derives from this illicit activity to establish underground gambling
operations clearly fulfills both prongs of the continuity-plusrelationship test.163 In practice, however, the existence of a pattern
of racketeering activity is rarely so clear-cut. Moreover, to attain a
criminal § 1962(c) conviction, prosecutors must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that an enterprise existed as laid out in the
indictment; that the enterprise influenced interstate commerce; that
the defendant was associated with the enterprise; and that the
defendant knowingly participated in the conduct of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.164 These burdensome
requirements dissuade prosecutors from instituting criminal RICO
actions against traffickers of counterfeit goods, particularly in light
of the ready availability of § 2320, a statute specifically tailored to
attack the ills of the counterfeit goods industry, that subsequent to
its recent amendment by Congress’ through the Stop
Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act (“Stop Act”),165 rivals
RICO in potency.
Amidst its zealous efforts to increase the penalties for
trafficking in counterfeit goods and its enactment of various
schemes aimed at diversifying the statutory avenues through which
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies could pursue and thwart

161

See id.
See id. at 242–43.
163
See id.
164
See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
165
Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)).
162
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counterfeit goods traffickers, Congress for a time lost sight of
§ 2320, the only federal statute that exists specifically to counteract
counterfeiting. When Congress originally enacted § 2320 as the
criminal component of the 1984 Act,166 the statute subjected
anyone who “intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or
services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in
connection with such goods or services” to the potential of fines
and incarceration following conviction.167 This portion of § 2320
retained its original language until the holding of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Giles168
persuaded Congress to redouble its focus on § 2320 and precipitate
a wholesale reinvention of the statute through its execution of the
Stop Act.169
Donald Ralph “Sonny” Giles owned a business named
“Fabulous Fakes,” which predictably specialized in selling lookalike versions of branded luxury goods at deeply discounted
prices.170 Giles also sold certain items in bulk at wholesale prices,
such as so-called patch sets displaying the trademarked logo of
Dooney & Bourke, an American luxury goods purveyor and
manufacturer of high-end handbags, luggage and other fashion
accessories.171 The patch sets Giles sold were composed of a
leather patch and a gold medallion, both of which featured the
Dooney & Bourke logo, accompanied by a leather strap used to
affix the medallion to a handbag.172 Once the recipient of a patch
set affixed the leather patch bearing Dooney & Bourke’s logo onto
a generic, non-branded purse or piece of luggage, it would appear
that Dooney & Bourke manufactured the generic item.173 Upon
learning of Giles’ patch set bulk sales, FBI agents established an
166

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 1501–1503, 98
Stat. 1976, 2178–83 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 & 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1116–1118 (West 2006)).
167
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 2178,
2178 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A § 2320 (West 2006)) (emphasis added).
168
213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).
169
Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)).
170
Giles, 213 F.3d at 1248.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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undercover operation and used a confidential informant to
purchase a bulk order of patch sets.174 After only two exchanges
with the informant, Fabulous Fakes shipped 1,000 patch sets
displaying the Dooney and Bourke logo to Oklahoma, where the
FBI seized them.175 Giles was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320 following a jury trial.176 The Tenth Circuit, however,
reversed Giles’ conviction, holding that the patch sets were not
goods under § 2320, and that § 2320 does not proscribe trafficking
in counterfeit labels when the labels are not used on or in
connection with other goods.177
If the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Giles did not provoke the ire
of the legislature, it certainly piqued their attention. Prior to Giles,
Congress’ chief strategy in its battle against counterfeit goods
trafficking was to include violations of § 2320 as predicate
offenses in laundry list statutes known for their stiff fines and
lengthy prison sentences—such as RICO178 and the Money
Laundering Act179—with the hope that such inclusions would
discourage traffickers from continuing to ply the counterfeit goods
trade. Traffickers, however, appreciating that the severity of
potential penalties is meaningless when one is all but certain not to
be caught, proved to be undaunted by the ominous range of statutes
under which the government hypothetically could, but in practice
did not, prosecute.180 As even its own reports grudgingly admit,
Congress’ dalliances with combating counterfeit goods trafficking
through statutes packing stiff penalties but suffering from only
tangential relation to the counterfeit merchandise industry were
ineffective in the overall fight against trademark counterfeiting.181
It took the Tenth Circuit’s de facto invalidation of § 2320 in
Giles,182 however, for Congress to recognize that in attempting to
174

Id.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 1251–53.
178
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000).
179
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2000).
180
See Christopher M. Dolan, Fits Over Counterfeiting: Legislative Accomplishments
and Directions, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 233, 253 (1999).
181
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 1–2 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1074, 1074–75.
182
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
175
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eradicate the counterfeit goods trade, deterrence is attained not
through the severity of an improbable punishment, but through the
certainty of a likely sanction.183
In the wake of Giles, Congress radically reassessed the manner
in which it fought the proliferation of the counterfeit goods trade
through federal criminal legislation and redoubled its attention to
§ 2320.184 The Stop Act constitutes the culmination of Congress’
reconstruction of the federal statutory enforcement scheme
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit goods. 185
The new,
improved, and more potent § 2320 handily dispenses with the
issues raised by the Tenth Circuit in Giles in its first section, which
includes a new clause threatening any offender who “intentionally
traffics or attempts to traffic in labels, patches, stickers, wrappers,
badges, emblems, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags,
documentation, or packaging of any type or nature, knowing that a
counterfeit mark has been applied thereto”186 with the heightened
fines and prison sentences enacted under the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.187 This new addition
to § 2320, if rigorously enforced, has the ability to markedly hinder
the operations counterfeiters who attempt to skirt the law by
importing apparel into the United States unbranded only to affix
labeling bearing counterfeit trademarks on American soil, without
resorting to the severe and untenable tactic of outlawing the
importation of unbranded products. The clause effects this aim by
heeding the call of a number of critics to criminalize trafficking in
the counterfeit marks themselves, irrespective of whether they are
attached to other goods.188
Congress’ modifications of § 2320 through the Stop Act,
however, do not end with this provision. To the contrary, the Stop
Act appends to § 2320 a civil forfeiture scheme triggered upon
183

See Dolan, supra note 180, at 253.
See Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006)).
185
Id.
186
Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(a) (West 2006)).
187
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 27 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
188
See, e.g., Amendolara, supra note 57, at 829.
184
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conviction that surpasses RICO’s in severity.189 Under the updated
statute, once a defendant is convicted of violating § 2320, the court
is required by law to impose upon the defendant, in addition to any
fine or prison sentence, mandatory civil forfeiture of any property
amounting to or derived from any proceeds obtained through
trafficking in counterfeit goods, such as a house; any property
used, or intended to be used, to traffic in, or facilitate, aid or abet
the trafficking of counterfeit goods, such as a vehicle; and any
property that displays or consists of a counterfeit trademark.190 It
is not difficult to imagine these provisions of the updated § 2320,
which do not contain a mercy clause for extenuating
circumstances, forcing a defendant to relinquish all his worldly
possessions upon conviction. This mandatory, inflexible civil
forfeiture provision imposes on traffickers of counterfeit goods a
certainty of punishment following conviction previously unseen in
the realm of criminal trademark counterfeiting legislation.191 With
suitable application of the statute, the updated § 2320 should serve
as a strong deterrent to counterfeiters.
The extent to which federal prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies will make use of the increased potency of the updated
§ 2320, however, remains to be seen. Prosecutors of course remain
free to seek indictments under any number of statutes when trying
defendants for the substantive crime of trafficking in counterfeit
trademarked goods,192 but prosecuting a trafficker of counterfeit
goods under the updated § 2320 is likely preferable to resorting to
other more convoluted statutes. The inherent complexity of a
189
See Pub. L. No. 109-181, sec. 1–2, § 2320, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(b)(1) (West 2006)).
190
Id.
191
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
192
In addition to the statutes already discussed at length in this essay, federal
prosecutors can charge two or more defendants collaborating with one another to traffic
in counterfeit goods with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 317 (2000). See, e.g., United
States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1989). The crimes of conspiring to traffic
and attempting to traffic in counterfeit goods may be established even if § 2320 is not
actually violated. See United States v. Foote, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Kan. 2002).
Prosecutors can also charge an offender who employs the mails to traffic in goods
bearing counterfeit trademarks that the offender holds out as legitimate with mail fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000), or with wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) for
perpetrating analogous conduct via telephone or internet activity.
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RICO prosecution plays a focal role in limiting the number of
RICO prosecutions launched based on unconventional RICO
predicate offenses such as § 2320 violations. It is exponentially
easier for a prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the two
straightforward mens rea prongs required to secure a conviction
under § 2320—that the defendant intended to traffic in goods and
knew they were counterfeit193—than it is to prove the multitude of
elements upon which a RICO conviction must be predicated.194
The relative simplicity of the updated § 2320 coupled with its
severe civil forfeiture provisions obviates the need to employ
RICO in counterfeit goods trafficking prosecutions. The extent to
which prosecutors employ the new § 2320 in the coming months
will soon demonstrate whether the resolve to diligently enforce
criminal trademark counterfeiting laws has finally arrived.
IV. NEW YORK’S STATUTORY TREATMENT OF CRIMINAL
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING IS INCOMPLETE
While a number of states have enacted legislation imposing a
range of criminal penalties for trafficking in counterfeit
trademarked goods,195 the high concentration of activity emanating
out of Lower Manhattan196 renders the provisions of the New York
Penal Law applicable to individuals and organized crime groups
who traffic in counterfeit trademarked merchandise particularly
salient examples of state-level statutory anti-counterfeiting
enforcement schemes.
As a consequence of the federal
government’s overarching regulatory authority over trademarks,
the New York Penal Law’s models its definitions of the terms
“trademark” and “counterfeit trademark” on definitions of the
same terms in the United States Code.197 Apart from these
193

See United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Infurnari, 647 F. Supp. 57, 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
194
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
195
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 350 (West 2006); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1040/2 (2006);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1190 (2006).
196
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
197
Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 (McKinney 2006) (defining a trademark as “any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a person
to identify goods made by a person and which distinguish them from those manufactured
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definitional similarities, however, § 2320 bears little resemblance
to its statutory brethren at the state level.198 The New York Penal
Law’s stratified codification scheme separates the action of
trafficking in goods bearing counterfeit trademarks into three
distinct but closely related crimes distinguishable by their
ascending levels of severity.199
The basic trademark counterfeiting offense under New York
law is trademark counterfeiting in the third degree,200 a class-A
misdemeanor offense punishable by no more than one year in
jail.201 An offender is guilty of violating this provision when “with
the intent to deceive or defraud . . . or . . . evade a lawful restriction
on the sale . . . or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures,
distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit
trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit
or sold by others which is in use and which is registered, filed or recorded under the laws
of this state or of any other state is registered in the principal register of the United States
patent and trademark office[,]” and a counterfeit trademark as “a spurious trademark or
an imitation of a trademark that is (a) used in connection with trafficking in goods; and
(b) used in connection with the sale, offering for sale or distribution of goods that are
identical with or substantially indistinguishable from a trademark . . . .”), with 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2000) (defining a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principle register established
by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown.”), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(e)(1)(A) (West 2006) (defining a
counterfeit trademark as “(A) a spurious mark—(i) that is used in connection with
trafficking in any goods, services, labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems,
medallions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, documentation or
packaging of any type or nature; (ii) that is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the principal register in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark
was registered; (iii) that is applied to or used in connection with the goods and services
for which the mark is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or is
applied to or consists of a label, patch, sticker, wrapper, badge, emblem, medallion,
charm, box, container, can, case, hangtag, documentation or packaging of any type or
nature that is designed, marketed, or otherwise intended to be used on or in connection
with the goods or services for which the mark is registered in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office; and (iv) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive . . . .”).
198
See supra note 195; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006).
199
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.71–165.72 (McKinney 2006).
200
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.71 (McKinney 2006).
201
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 2006).
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for the purpose of affixing it to any goods.”202 The more serious
offenses of trademark counterfeiting in the second degree, a classE felony with a maximum prison sentence of four years,203 and
trademark counterfeiting in the first degree, a class-C felony
carrying a maximum prison sentence of fifteen years,204 are
identical to the lesser offense of trademark counterfeiting in the
third degree, save the “retail value” of the goods counterfeit.
When the retail value of the goods bearing counterfeit marks
surpasses $1,000, trademark counterfeiting in the third degree
becomes trademark counterfeiting in the second degree,205 while
when the retail value of the goods bearing counterfeit trademarks
surpasses $100,000, the offense becomes trademark counterfeiting
in the first degree.206
The use of “retail value” figures to stratify what are effectively
identical criminal acts into three distinct crimes constitutes one of
the more intriguing aspects of New York’s statutory treatment of
trademark counterfeiting and poses an interesting contrast to
federal law. When the trademark counterfeiting statutes first came
into effect in 1992, the statutes defined “value” as the “value of
such goods, or trademark.”207 The “retail value” measure arose out
of People v. Kim,208 when prosecutors sought to indict a defendant
arrested in connection with police officers’ seizure of 8,000
counterfeit handbags on charges of trademark counterfeiting in the
first degree, on the premise that the value of the trademarks at
issue, calculated on the basis of worldwide sales of the holders of
the trademarks, easily surpassed the $100,000 threshold.209 The
court declined to adopt this novel prosecutorial formulation,
holding instead that value should be “calculated as the incremental
value given to the goods by the affixing of the appropriated

202

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.71.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 165.72 (McKinney 2006).
204
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 165.73 (McKinney 2006).
205
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.72.
206
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.73.
207
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt. (McKinney 2006) (William C. Donnino, Practice
Commentary).
208
621 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994).
209
Id. at 480.
203
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trademark.”210 Subsequent to People v. Kim, the Legislature
amended the definition of value to “the retail value of all such
goods bearing counterfeit trademarks.”211 Unerring adherence to
this formulation, however, drives prosecutors and law enforcement
agents to chase always after the largest distributors of counterfeit
goods, often at the expense of ignoring smaller-scale traffickers.212
Prosecutors are able to charge high-volume wholesalers based on
the retail value of the counterfeit goods they recover, despite the
fact that the wholesalers’ sale price is by definition below the retail
price of the merchandise.213
The federal analogue of the New York state statutes, § 2320,
does not follow suit in assigning various traffickers of counterfeit
goods to predetermined strata of criminal culpability based on the
retail value of their counterfeit goods.214 More curiously, § 2320
also does not impose a liability baseline beneath which its
provisions are inapplicable.215 Under New York state law,
prosecutors can only charge defendants caught with counterfeit
trademarked goods the retail value of which is less than the $1,000
liability floor with a misdemeanor.216 There is no federal
misdemeanor for minor violations of § 2320.217 Two theories
explain the absence of such a penalty, which would be ideal for use
against low-level traffickers of counterfeit trademarked goods.
First, Congress may believe that trafficking in counterfeit goods is
so grave a crime that even the most minor instances of such
conduct, if discovered by law enforcement authorities, warrant
felony charges. The second, and more probable, explanation is
that Congress finds that at its lowest levels, trafficking in
counterfeit goods is not an appropriate province for federal
legislation. The notion that one can technically face federal felony
charges under § 2320 for a single isolated sale of a counterfeit
paperweight nonetheless remains unsettling.
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. at 481–82.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.72–165.73 (McKinney 2006).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt. (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary).
See supra notes 205–210 and accompanying text.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320 (West 2006).
See id.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.71–165.72 (McKinney 2006).
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320.
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The glaring absence of the trademark counterfeiting statutes
from New York’s enterprise corruption218 and money laundering
statutes219 is even more perplexing. Like RICO and the Money
Laundering Act, New York’s enterprise corruption and money
laundering statutes include enumerated laundry lists of crimes
constituting predicate acts that may underpin convictions under the
relevant substantive statute.220 In contrast to the federal statutory
scheme, where § 2320 is catalogued as both a laundry list offense
for the Money Laundering Act and a predicate offense for RICO,
none of New York’s trademark counterfeiting statutes are
“criminal act” predicates for its enterprise corruption and money
laundering statutes.221
While the omission of trademark
counterfeiting in the third degree is expected, the absence of
trademark counterfeiting in the second, and even more so in the
first, degree is confounding.
The Legislature added the trademark counterfeiting crimes to
the Penal Law because it “believed that prosecution of those who
specialize in fraud by the use of counterfeit trademarks would be
facilitated by creation of a crime specifically tailored to cover such
conduct.”222 It apparently did not believe, however, that corrupt
enterprises could systematically perpetrate a pattern of fraud
through the use of counterfeit trademarks, or that narcotics
traffickers could use the sale of goods bearing counterfeit
trademarks as means of laundering the profits from their narcotics
sales.223 The Legislature’s omission of felony-level trademark
counterfeiting from the list of “criminal act” predicates appears so
unfounded that it might be the result of an oversight. If, however,
the Legislature consciously omitted felony trademark
counterfeiting from the “criminal act,” its dedication to diligent
governmental enforcement of criminal trademark counterfeiting
laws is cast in serious doubt.
218

Organized Crime Control Act, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–460.80 (McKinney
2006).
219
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.00–470.25 (McKinney 2006).
220
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.10(1)(a), 470.00.
221
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10.
222
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.70 cmt. (McKinney 2006) (William C. Donnino, Practice
Commentary).
223
See supra note 221.
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V. UNCONVENTIONAL CIVIL ENFORCEMENT MEASURES ARE
EFFECTIVE IN THWARTING COUNTERFEITERS
Lawful trademark owners cannot rely upon governmental
actors to enforce the criminal statutory schemes that proscribe
trademark counterfeiting.224 Trademark holders who insist on
vigorous protection of their brands against the intrusions of
counterfeiters must thus take unilateral civil action against
traffickers of goods bearing their counterfeit trademarks. The
Lanham Act affords trademark owners the most immediate means
through which to pursue counterfeiters.225 Under the Lanham
Act’s recovery provisions, once a trademark holder prevails in a
civil action against a counterfeiter, the trademark owner may
recover from the counterfeiter any profits the counterfeiter attained
by using the owner’s counterfeit trademark and any damages
suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the counterfeiting, as
well as court costs.226 The Lanham Act additionally mandates that,
absent an explicit finding of exigent circumstances, the presiding
trial court judge must by law award treble damages and attorneys’
fees to the trademark owner,227 and offers trademark holders the
opportunity to elect at any time prior to the court’s imposition of
final judgment to recover statutory damages in place of actual
damages and profits.228
While these recovery provisions suggest that the Lanham
Act229 provides trademark owners with ample opportunities to
attain pecuniary compensation and damages from counterfeiters,
the reality remains that most civil remedies remain largely
ineffective because counterfeiters hide their assets so cunningly
The Lanham Act’s
that recovery becomes impossible.230
231
mandatory imposition of treble damages against civil defendants
adjudged to be counterfeiters may appear to be a powerful weapon
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

See generally Neumer, supra note 22.
See 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006).
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (West 2006).
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b) (West 2006).
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(c) (West 2006).
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2006).
See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 385–86.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b).
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in fighting trademark counterfeiting, but treble damages pose
neither a threat nor a concern to wily counterfeiters who
manipulate their finances to suggest they own no assets against
which courts can assess damages.232 Counterfeit goods traffickers
who file for bankruptcy, whether feigned or legitimate, as well as
those who respond to a court’s assessment of a civil judgment
against them with an outright refusal to comply with its terms, pose
additional significant impediments to rightful trademark owners
seeking to curb the counterfeiting of their brands through civil
action.233
The Lanham Act234 also fails to provide lawful trademark
owners who unearth counterfeit iterations of their trademarked
goods for sale in otherwise reputable retail outlets with a suitable
remedy. The Third Circuit’s decision in Gucci America, Inc. v.
Daffy’s, Inc.235 illustrates the precise nature of this deficiency.
This case arose when Daffy’s, a discount clothing retail chain,
acquired what it believed to be 594 authentic Gucci “Jackie-O”
handbags in three different sizes from a Sara’s Collection, Inc., a
reputable supplier that Daffy’s had purchased products from in the
past.236
Daffy’s attempted to authenticate these bags by
dispatching an employee to a Gucci outlet store with one of the
bags in hand, where a Gucci clerk confirmed the bag was
genuine.237 Daffy’s also sent one of the bags to the Gucci repair
center in New York, which fixed the bag and returned it to Daffy’s
with no additional inquiry.238 Daffy’s eventually sold 588 of these
594 bags, reaping a gross profit of $51,064.12.239 Daffy’s
maintained it remained blissfully unaware of any problem with the
bags until it received a letter from Gucci attorneys indicating the
bags, while of startlingly high quality, were in fact counterfeit.240
Gucci shortly thereafter filed a suit against Daffy’s in the U.S.
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

See Peterson, supra note 44, at 492.
See id.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006).
354 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
See id. at 230 (majority opinion).
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District Court for the District of New Jersey, in which it sought to
obtain Daffy’s profits from its sale of the counterfeit bags, and to
enjoin Daffy’s from further use of the Gucci trademark.241 The
district court ruled that Gucci was entitled to neither an injunction
against Daffy’s, nor the discount retailer’s profits from its sale of
the bags bearing counterfeit Gucci trademarks.242 The Third
Circuit, in a two-to-one split decision, affirmed, holding that
because Gucci could not prove that Daffy’s knew the bags were
counterfeit, it could not recover profits from the discount
retailer.243 The court concluded that “[t]he price and quality of the
of the handbags at issue, the small number of the bags sold,
Daffy’s status as an innocent infringer, and the possibility that
Gucci could recover from the actual manufacturer of the bags all
weigh against awarding profits.”244
The Third Circuit’s assertion that Gucci might be able to
recover from the counterfeiters themselves is of course little more
than pretense,245 but it is nonetheless disquieting in its
offhandedness. Equally unnerving is the circuit court’s affirmation
of the lower court’s holding that Daffy’s was an innocent infringer
based solely on the fact that Daffy’s had one of the bags
authenticated by a retail clerk in a Gucci outlet store and sent
another bag to Gucci’s service center for repair.246 Most unsettling
of all, however, is the fact that the Third Circuit’s holding in Gucci
America may have emboldened other seemingly reputable discount
retailers to dabble in the sale of ersatz luxury goods items bearing
counterfeit trademarks. In June of 2006, Fendi, a subsidiary of
Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy (“LVMH”), filed suit against Wal241

See id. at 228, 230, 231.
See id. at 231.
243
See id. at 228, 242, 243.
244
Id. at 242–43.
245
See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text.
246
See Gucci America, 354 F.3d at 244–45 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (Daffy’s perfunctory
attempt to authenticate the bags “was simply a superficial effort to cover itself in the
event of a lawsuit. Daffy’s did not take the bag to the store manager or to someone in
authority in the Gucci organization who was familiar with the construction of the bag. It
satisfied its concern by asking some unknown retail clerk of unknown experience, of
unknown authority, and with unknown familiarity with the intricacies of bag
construction, to confirm the authenticity of the bag. It also sent a damaged bag to the
Gucci repair center without any specific inquiry as to the authenticity of the bag.”).
242

COCKS_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

2007

1/23/2007 4:42 PM

COUNTERFEIT GOODS

543

Mart Stores, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, alleging that a number of stores in WalMart’s Sam’s Club wholesale club chain were selling handbags
and other small leather goods bearing counterfeit Fendi
trademarks.247 While Fendi is seeking an injunction and damages,
Wal-Mart maintains the handbags and leather goods its Sam’s
Club stores are selling are authentic Fendi products, not
counterfeits.248 Even if the handbags and leather goods ultimately
prove themselves to be counterfeit, however, Fendi’s ability to
recover profits from Wal-Mart in the wake of Gucci America is
uncertain at best.
No doubt because of the problems lawful trademark owners
encounter attempting to recover against counterfeiters under the
Lanham Act,249 when Congress enacted the 1996 Act250 it appeared
that the legislature was nearly as enthusiastic about the prospect of
lawful trademark owners employing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the civil
remedies section of RICO, against counterfeiters as it was about
bestowing upon federal prosecutors the ability to combat the
counterfeit goods trade through the statutory heavy weaponry of
RICO’s criminal provisions.251 Under § 1964(c), any individual or
entity that suffers an injury to his business or property as the result
of a violation of § 1962 has the ability to sue an offender to recover
treble damages and attorneys’ fees.252 While a civil RICO plaintiff
must allege all the elements required to secure a criminal RICO
conviction, a civil RICO plaintiff needs to prove these elements
only by a preponderance of the evidence.253 Few lawful trademark
owners, however, have made use of RICO’s civil action provision
to pursue counterfeiters, because § 1964(c) affords trademark
owners no ability to make additional pecuniary recoveries against
247
See Fendi Says Wal-Mart Is Selling Counterfeits, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2006, at B3;
Fendi Sues Wal-Mart on Counterfeiting, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, June 13, 2006, at 2.
248
See Fendi Sues Wal-Mart on Counterfeiting, supra note 247.
249
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006).
250
Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
251
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-556, at 6–7 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074,
1080–81.
252
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
253
See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491, 496 (1985).
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counterfeiters over and above those authorized under the Lanham
Act.254 Additionally, though it is more difficult and timeconsuming to prove a RICO violation, even by a lower
preponderance of the evidence standard, than it is to prove a
Lanham Act violation, plaintiffs seeking to recover under both
statutes face the same significant impediments in attaining actual
pecuniary recovery against counterfeiters. Lawful trademark
owners thus have little incentive to employ § 1964(c) to protect
their brands.
The most obvious means of circumventing the obstacles that
hinder trademark owners’ ability to recover from counterfeiters has
proven to be one of the most effective: taking action against the
individuals and entities that enable traffickers of counterfeit goods
to ply their illicit trade, rather than pursing counterfeiters directly.
The ability of trademark owners to initiate action against parties
who facilitate counterfeit goods traffickers’ unlawful business is
rooted in the judicially-constructed doctrine of contributory
trademark liability.255 Under this doctrine, trademark holders may
sue parties that provide the site and facilities for known counterfeit
goods trafficking activities.256 Plaintiffs typically fulfill the crucial
component of the doctrine—that the third party enabler knows
counterfeiters are using the site or facilities it owns to traffic in
counterfeit goods—by sending notice letters to the enablers
averring to illicit use.257 Courts hold that willful blindness on the
part of an enabler constitutes knowledge under the doctrine.258 If a
trademark owner is unable to show actual knowledge or willful
blindness, but can demonstrate that the enabler has reason to know
of the counterfeit goods trafficking activity, the trademark holder
254

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (providing for the recovery of treble damages and
attorneys’ fees), with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2006) (also providing for the recovery of
treble damages and attorneys’ fees).
255
See, e.g., Power Test Petrol. Distribs., Inc. v. Manhattan & Queens Fuel Corp.,
556 F. Supp. 392, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[T]he doctrine of contributory infringement
was developed as a judicial gloss on the infringement provision of the Lanham Act.”).
256
See Fonsovia, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)).
257
See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 416.
258
See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir.
1989)).
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cannot recover treble damages or attorneys’ fees, but may still
recover actual damages.259
Gucci has employed this doctrine to take action against an
internet service provider used by a trafficker of jewelry bearing
Gucci’s counterfeit trademark to advertise its illicit operation,260
and Tiffany recently used it as grounds to file suit against eBay for
facilitating auctions of counterfeit jewelry.261 Trademark owners
achieve the most success under the doctrine, however, when they
sue the landlords of the storefronts out of which traffickers sell
counterfeit goods.262 Once trademark owners serve landlords with
notice of counterfeiting activity on property the landlord owns, the
landlord must take “reasonable steps to rid the premises of the
illegal activity,”263 including evicting the counterfeiters,264 or else
risk exposing themselves to civil liability for the counterfeiting.265
Trademark owners who sue landlords under a unique facet of New
York state law, which holds landlords who knowingly permit
tenants to engage in illegal trade or business on their premises
jointly and severally liable for the conduct of their tenants,266 enjoy
an additional avenue of civil enforcement. New York courts
explicitly hold that a landlord’s knowledge of his tenants’ use of
his premises for trademark counterfeiting subjects the landlord to
full-scale liability for the criminal conduct of his tenants.267 The
doctrine of contributory liability is the most effective weapon
trademark holders can employ to combat counterfeiting at both the
state and federal levels because it enables them to pursue entities
incapable of concealing their assets. These entities must either
eradicate counterfeiting on the premises over which they have

259

See id. at 1151; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2006).
See Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
261
See First Amended Complaint, Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4607
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004), 2004 WL 1413904.
262
See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 418.
263
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, No. 93 Civ. 6783, slip op. at 1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1996).
264
See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
265
See Kolsun & Bayer, supra note 20, at 413.
266
See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 231 (McKinney 2006).
267
See 1165 Broadway Corp. v. Dayana of N.Y. Sportswear, 633 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726
(Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1995).
260
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dominion and control, or else confront the unpleasant prospect of
exposing themselves to treble damages liability.
Pursuing third-party enablers of counterfeit goods trafficking
under the doctrine of contributory liability may actually be meeting
with some success in curtailing the counterfeit goods trade in the
United States. In July of 2005, LVMH, after having filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
against Richard Carroll, the landlord of seven properties on Canal
Street out of which tenants engaged in the trafficking of counterfeit
Louis Vuitton bags, reached a permanent injunction on consent.268
The injunction required Carroll to post signs in highly visible
locations inside and outside his properties warning that the
businesses operating on the premises are not authorized Louis
Vuitton retailers, and that the purchase of counterfeits may result
in legal action.269 The injunction further ordered Carroll move to
immediately evict the current tenants at the seven premises, and
inform future tenants of the consequences of selling counterfeit
goods, which under the terms of the injunction include mandatory
eviction if LVMH owns the counterfeit trademarks.270 Finally, the
injunction called for a monitor to conduct weekly warrantless
searches of the public and private areas of the seven properties for
a year, with LVMH and Carroll splitting the costs.271 Detractors of
this tactic would argue that such lawsuits serve only to drive the
counterfeit goods trade quite literally further underground, into
clandestine basement bazaars slightly north of Canal Street.272
LVMH, however, appears to find such criticism unpersuasive, for
it has subsequently brought two nearly identical suits against
additional landlords, the most recent of which implicated twenty
268

See Liza Casabona, LVMH Wins Judgment Against Landlord, WOMEN’S WEAR
DAILY, July 1, 2005, at 2; Ross Tucker, LVMH Notches Victory in Counterfeiting Case,
WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Apr. 21, 2005, at 14.
269
See Casabona, supra note 268; Tucker, supra note 268.
270
See Casabona, supra note 268; Tucker, supra note 268.
271
See Casabona, supra note 268; Anthony Ramirez, Chinatown Journal; On Canal St.,
Ferreting Out the Louis Vuitton Imposters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 1, at 27; Tucker,
supra note 268.
272
See Orla Healy, Ab Fab Fakes—High Quality Bags in Chinatown Underground,
N.Y. POST, Dec. 1, 2005, at 22 (describing a covert journey, replete with lookouts and
handoffs, to a subterranean retailer of high-quality counterfeit handbags located in a
basement in northern Chinatown).

COCKS_GALLEYPROOF_120106.DOC

2007

1/23/2007 4:42 PM

COUNTERFEIT GOODS

547

premises on Canal Street out of which counterfeit goods are
trafficked, and obtained commensurate injunctions in both
actions.273 The terms of the injunctions now apply to as many as
100 street-level retailers.274
VI. CRIMINAL TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING PROHIBITIONS
MUST BE ENFORCED MORE CONSISTENTLY
The signs that LVMH mandates property owners post as a
component of compliance with its standard injunction caution in
pertinent part: “this retailer is not authorized or licensed to sell
Louis Vuitton merchandise. The N.Y.P.D. and Louis Vuitton
investigate any sale or purchase of counterfeit merchandise at this
location. Counterfeiting is civilly and criminally punishable under
federal and state law by up to 10 years of imprisonment and
$2,000,000 in fines.”275 These notices suggest that LVMH is not
itself above resorting to chicanery in combating the counterfeit
goods trade by attempting to frighten potential purchasers of
merchandise bearing counterfeit Louis Vuitton trademarks out of
making such acquisitions. The warning is of course on its face
literally true, but it is essentially an elaborate piece of sales
puffery, for under United States law at both the federal and state
levels, retail purchasers of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks—
customers of the lowest-level traffickers—are not subject to
criminal penalties. A trademark holder such as LVMH could
conceivably sue retail purchasers of counterfeit goods bearing their
trademarks under the Lanham Act,276 but would never in practice
initiate such an action because the attorney assigned to draft the
complaint in such a case would earn more money in the one
quarter of a billable hour it took to fill in boilerplate than the mark
holder could ever hope to recover trough the suit. Yet while legal
273

See Galloni, supra note 28; Ramirez, supra note 271.
See Ramirez, supra note 271.
275
Press Release, LVMH, Louis Vuitton Obtains Preliminary Injunction Representing
Unprecedented Victory in Battle Against Counterfeiting and Reduction of Criminal
Activity on Canal Street (Apr. 19, 2005) (on file with author), available
at http://www.arentfox.com/press_releases/content659_supplement.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2006).
276
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1129 (West 2006).
274
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professionals versed in the current state of the law would quickly
finger LVMH’s notice as an abject scare tactic, it is a tactic that
may well realize its intended goal, since most of the individuals
who comprise counterfeit goods traffickers’ target market of
tourists, suburbanites, and young individuals eager to keep pace
with fashion trends likely have little or no knowledge of the
workings of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 and the New York Penal Law.
Then again, consumer demand for counterfeit luxury
merchandise shows no signs of abating despite the fact that some
purchasers of counterfeit trademarked goods apparently believe
they are buying stolen but authentic merchandise,277 which they
presumably understand, at least in an abstract sense, constitutes the
crime of receiving stolen property. Perhaps LVMH’s disingenuous
warning notices may not pack the deterrent punch the company
hopes. The misleading phrasing of the warning notices could also
be the product of wishful thinking on the part of a company
headquartered in France, a nation which has criminalized the
purchase of counterfeit products278 and recently taken to slapping
Chinese tourists who arrive in the country carrying ersatz luxury
goods such as counterfeit Louis Vuitton handbags with heavy
fines.279 LVMH would likely be overjoyed, and its fellow luxury
goods purveyors would be similarly enthused, if the United States
elected to follow France’s lead and criminalize the purchase as
well as the sale of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks.
Any move by either the federal government or one of the states
to criminalize within the United States the act of acquiring as well
as vending counterfeit trademarked merchandise, however, would
prove an egregious mistake. It is unsurprising that countries such
as France and Italy whose national economies are heavily
dependant on the luxury goods sector have criminalized the retail
purchase of counterfeit trademarked goods,280 since such
legislative action is an unabashed boon to the luxury goods
industry. For the other sectors of the economy and for society as a
277

See Ramirez, supra note 271.
See Galloni, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
279
See Howard W. French, Next Wave of Camera-Wielding Tourists Is From China,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at A3.
280
See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
278
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whole, however, it is essentially worthless. Luxury items, though
they receive the most attention, are not the only type of goods
subject to counterfeiting. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals and vehicle
parts are both growing problems in the United States.281 If an
American government entity were to criminalize the purchase of
counterfeit trademarked goods, it would have to adopt a carefullybalanced legislative scheme to avert the public relations nightmare
of overzealous law enforcement officers arresting, and determined
prosecutors convicting, a confused grandmother who purchases
counterfeit medicine over the internet, or a father of four who buys
counterfeit brake pads at a cut-rate auto supply store because the
store advertised them as simply being on sale.282
Such a statutory scheme would likely involve a “knowingly
and intentionally” mens rea requirement under which prosecutors
would have to prove that the defendant not only made a purchase
of counterfeit goods, but made the purchase knowing that the
merchandise was counterfeit.283
Such a strict mens rea
requirement would belie the purpose of such a statute by allowing
most defendants to claim ignorance and escape conviction. The
only defendant a judge or jury would be likely to convict under
such a stringent mens rea requirement is, unsurprisingly, a
purchaser of counterfeit luxury goods, who is unlikely to prevail
on a defense that she reasonably believed that the Prada bag she
bought in Chinatown was real, even though she bought it for less
than one-tenth the price of the legitimate article. A statute
criminalizing the purchase of counterfeit trademarked goods would
thus effectively criminalize only the purchase of counterfeit luxury
goods,284 and an industry in which the rainmakers are $9000
handbags285 does not warrant this quotient of individualized
statutory protection.

281

See generally Amendolara, supra note 57, at 810–12.
See id.
283
See supra text accompanying note 193.
284
Such a statute would also effectively criminalize the purchase of pirated music and
filmed entertainment, but these products are distinguishable on the ground that they are
subject to copyright rather than trademark protection.
285
See Tracie Rozhon, Even if Just a Bauble, Luxury Counts for Holidays, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2004, § 1, at C4 (noting the list price of the Hermes Birkin bag as $9000).
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To be sure, illegal commerce in trademarked counterfeit goods
is not a victimless crime. Legitimate manufacturers, wholesalers
and retailers across all spectrums of the national economy lose
hundreds of billions of dollars each year at the hands of trademark
counterfeiters.286 The illicit industry of trafficking in counterfeit
trademarks, however, does not merely exact pecuniary losses from
wealthy corporations.
It also inflicts a very human, and
occasionally deadly, toll on the individuals on both sides of the law
who wage the daily battle over counterfeits in the streets. To
understand how ruinous the counterfeit goods trade can be for both
law enforcement officers and innocent bystanders, one need look
no further than former police officer Bryan Conroy’s mortal
shooting of Ousmane Zongo, a West African immigrant, during a
N.Y.P.D. raid on a counterfeit compact-disc trafficking operation
in Chelsea and subsequent conviction for criminally negligent
homicide;287 Zongo had nothing to do with the counterfeiting
ring.288 The illegal industry can also be deadly for traffickers—a
suspected counterfeiter fell to his death from a ninth-story window
in Koreatown while attempting to flee from police officers
executing a search warrant for trademark counterfeiting
activity289—and, at least tangentially, for their pursuers: a
N.Y.P.D. sergeant attached to an elite squad and said to be in
excellent physical condition collapsed and died after giving chase
to a vendor of counterfeit Oakley sunglasses in SoHo.290
Criminalizing the purchase of counterfeit goods, however, would
not have prevented these deaths, and is as unlikely to prevent
future deaths as it is to stem the unceasing tide of counterfeit
goods.
Admittedly, the American statutes in force at both the federal
and New York state levels that criminalize trafficking in goods
bearing counterfeit trademarks are not perfect. Congress should
286

See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2006). See Amanda Hartocollis, Officer
Guilty of Negligence in ’03 Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at A1.
288
See Sabrina Tavernise & William K. Rashbaum, Charges Are Seen In Police
Gunfire, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A1.
289
Man Falls to Death from Midtown Building, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at B4.
290
Michael Wilson, Police Officer Dies After Chasing Sidewalk Vendor in SoHo, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004, § 1, at 31.
287
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amend the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2320, to stratify the crime of
trafficking in counterfeit goods or services into multiple offense
levels, so that street-level vendors of counterfeit trademarked
goods, who are often caught between law enforcement officers
seeking to curb counterfeiting and organized crime groups
pressuring them to sell ersatz merchandise,291 do not face the same
federal felony charges prosecutors would levy against the leader of
the organized crime syndicate forcing them to sell the counterfeit
goods. Conversely, the New York State Legislature should amend
the Penal Law so that it lists felony-level trademark counterfeiting
offenses292 among the designated “criminal acts” that can serve as
predicate offenses under the state’s enterprise corruption293 and
money laundering statutes.294 The Legislature should also follow
the lead of Congress and amend the seizure and destruction of
goods provision of the criminal trademark counterfeiting statute295
to call for mandatory, rather than optional, seizure of any and all
goods “manufactured, sold, offered for sale, distributed or
produced in violation”296 of the state’s prohibitions on trademark
counterfeiting, and further amend the provision by expanding to
include mandatory seizure of any and all instrumentalities used to
violate the trademark counterfeiting prohibitions. Even without
these relatively minor amendments, however, the criminal statutes
proscribing trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods currently
in place at the both the federal and New York state levels, amount
to formidable anti-counterfeiting weapons if prosecutors and law
enforcement authorities apply them dynamically.
The illicit counterfeit goods industry in the United States
continues to proliferate. The economic losses attributable to the
counterfeit goods trade in the United States have increased
$50 billion since 2001 alone.297 The amount of money New York
291

See Adam Fifield, The Knockoff Squad, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, § 14, at 1.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.72–165.73 (McKinney 2006).
293
Organized Crime Control Act, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00–460.80 (McKinney
2006).
294
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.00–470.25 (McKinney 2006).
295
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.74 (McKinney 2006).
296
Id.
297
Compare Flynn, supra note 6 (noting that the counterfeit goods trade costs American
businesses $250 million each year), with Julian E. Barnes, Fake Goods Are Flowing
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City loses in uncollected tax revenue each year at the hands of
commercial counterfeiters has increased by over $600 million
since 1997.298
Despite the international breadth, massive
pecuniary scope and deadly effects of the illegal counterfeit goods
trade, in addition to the ominous presence of organized crime
syndicates and terrorist groups in the illicit industry, detractors
erroneously maintain that trademark counterfeiting remains a
victimless crime. Some go so far as to assert that counterfeiting
may not even harm the owners of the trademarks that criminals
counterfeit.299 Others are less vocal, but their actions speak
volumes. In August of 2005, this author witnessed New York
County Assistant District Attorneys refuse to file felony charges
against an offender whom the police discovered in a raid amidst a
sea of counterfeit luxury goods, items whose retail value far
exceeded the $1000 statutory threshold for felony-level
culpability,300 in direct contravention of the repeated and insistent
requests of the arresting N.Y.P.D. officers. As this observation
anecdotally demonstrates, it is not a lack of statutory potency that
presents a hindrance to current criminal anti-counterfeiting
prosecutions.
New York’s trademark counterfeiting statutes, and especially
their recently amended and fortified federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320, provide prosecutors with strong and versatile enforcement
implements. The new and long-overdue mandatory seizure
provisions of § 2320 in particular provide a certainty of
punishment upon conviction not previously present in the realm of
criminal trademark counterfeiting, and thus present a unique
opportunity for federal prosecutors to make real inroads against
Under the Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001, § 3, at 4 (reporting that the American
economy loses $200 billion to counterfeit goods annually).
298
Compare Press Release, supra note 9 (noting that New York City loses $1.03 billion
in tax revenue at the hands of the counterfeit goods trade), with Peter F. Vallone,
Speaker, N.Y. City Council, Address to the Counterfeiting Press Conference (Dec. 7,
1997) (noting that New York City loses over $400 million per year in tax revenues from
the counterfeit goods industry).
299
See, e.g., Stewart Whitwell, Brand Papers—Piracy: Faking It Can Be Good, BRAND
STRATEGY, May 8, 2006, at 30, available at 2006 WL 7914348 (arguing that being
targeted by counterfeiters can be beneficial to a brand’s image and to the brand owner’s
business).
300
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.72 (McKinney 2006).
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counterfeiters.
To date, however, criminal trademark
counterfeiting prosecutions at both the state and federal level
systematically lack the zeal, ingenuity and unrelenting
determination of their civil counterparts.
As long as the
individuals and agencies tasked with prosecuting traffickers of
counterfeit goods persist in their lack of resolve to act with the
diligence, expedience, and evenhandedness required to rein in such
a pervasive criminal activity, the tide of the illicit trademark
counterfeiting trade will continue to flow unabated.

